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CLEARLY DEFINING PRECLUSIVE CORPORATE
LOCK-UPS: A BRIGHT-LINE TEST FOR LOCK-UP
PROVISIONS IN DELAWARE
Michael G. Hatch
Abstract: Merger mania currently grips the United States as corporations scramble to find
merger partners to achieve strategic goals. In their quest for a competitive advantage, large
corporations are increasingly willing to use hostile takeovers to deny competitors the benefits
of a strategic mergers. In response, merging corporations have granted record-breaking lockup. provisions in an attempt to protect their deals. Delaware's current framework for
evaluating the validity of lock-up provisions requires courts to apply different levels of
scrutiny depending on the form of the transaction. However, Delaware courts have
inconsistently applied the correct standard and have failed to identify preclusive lock-ups.
Although legal commentators have proposed alternatives to the current doctrine, none have
been able to provide a solution without sacrificing the recognized benefits of lock-up
provisions. This Comment examines the Delaware courts' inability to evaluate lock-up
provisions properly and argues that a bright-line test severely limiting the value of lock-up
provisions to three percent of a bidder's offer would solve the current dilemma. Without such
a test, Delaware courts are unable to protect the interests of shareholders while still allowing
the use of lock-ups to facilitate mergers.

Record-breaking merger and acquisition volume in each of the
previous four years has placed the United States in the midst of an
unprecedented merger phenomenon.' Ten of the largest transactions in
history' were announced in 1998 and 1999.? Fueling this merger boom is
the fact that the merger, offering a quick solution for businesses seeking
greater competitiveness, resources, market share, and new technology,
has become the preferred tool for strategic and corporate development. 4
This current wave of mega-mergers, coupled with the intense
competition for merger partners, has resulted in merger battles with
fiercely contested auctions' for control of corporations.6
1. See Toby Myerson & Judith Thoyer, CorporateFinance,London, Jan. 2000, at 109-12.
2. Transactions are measured by equity value.
3. See Myerson & Thoyer, supranote 1, at 109-12.
4. See Martin Sikora, Counting Transactions in the Trillions: Dealmakers Take Aim at the M&A
Record of $1.3 Trillion Set in Up-Tempo 1998, Mergers and Acquisitions Journal, Mar.-Apr. 1999,
at 5.
5. An auction occurs when directors decide to sell the corporation to the highest bidder. In an
auction the target corporation will solicit bids and the highest bidder will obtain control of the
corporation. See 3A James Solheim & Kenneth Elkins, Fletcher Cyclopedia ofthe Law ofPrivate
Corporations§ 1041.50 (perm. ed.).
6. See Myerson & Thoyer, supranote 1, at 109-12.
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Merging corporations often seek to defend their deals from subsequent
bidders with defensive measures known as lock-up provisions. Lock-ups
are promises by a target company's board of directors to compensate the
prospective acquirer if the target breaches or does not consummate the
merger agreement.7 Lock-ups are designed to protect the negotiated deal
by compensating the prospective acquirer and by imposing the threat of
additional costs on other competitors who might decide to make offers.8
Under certain circumstances, courts must enjoin lock-ups that preclude
shareholders the opportunity to receive other potentially higher offers in
the merger transaction. However, courts are unable to make this
determination accurately because it involves evaluating competing bids,
an increasingly complex calculation in the current merger environment.
As a result, the size and scope of defensive measures have skyrocketed
as both courts and corporations have been unsure how to determine the
validity of lock-ups.9
This Comment examines Delaware courts' treatment of lock-up
provisions granted in negotiated strategic mergers.' ° Part I describes the
emergence of the strategic merger, the accompanying costs and risks
magnified by the current merger environment, and lock-up provisions in
general. Part II discusses Delaware's current doctrinal framework and the
legal standards for evaluating lock-up provisions. Part III describes legal
commentators' proposed alternatives to the current standards. Part IV
argues that courts are ill-equipped to identify preclusive lock-ups and,
therefore, unable to apply the current standards to lock-up provisions.
This Part further argues that the proposed alternate standards fail to solve
the current dilemma because they sacrifice the recognized benefits of
lock-up provisions. Part V of this Comment concludes that a new brightline rule limiting lock-ups to three percent of the bidder's offer clearly
defines preclusive lock-up provisions. This rule will not only facilitate
mergers but also maximize shareholder value in the resulting
transactions.

7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See Floyd Norris, Is $2 Billion FairPaymentfor a Fiancde Left at the Altar?, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 5, 1999, at CI.
10. Delaware is the United States' preeminent corporate-law jurisdiction. The total number of
firms incorporated in Delaware is 450,395, which includes more than half of all Fortune 500 firms.
Delaware Economic Development Office: 2000 Delaware Statistical Overview (visited Aug. 9,
2000) <http://www.state.de.us/dedo/publications/databooklindex.htm>.
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I.

MERGERS: CURRENT TRENDS, RISKS, AND THE USE OF
LOCK-UPS

In the 1990s, large corporations began to use mergers to gain
advantage within their industries." This phenomenon, combined with
rapidly increasing stock market values, has greatly increased the price
paid in recent mergers. 2 As a result, corporations seeking merger
partners have faced increasing transaction costs. In addition, large

corporations are no longer content to sit by as competitors enter strategic
mergers. Large corporations are willing to compete for targets 3 by

making unsolicited bids after a competitor has announced a merger
agreement. 4 In partial response to these increased costs and competition,
the size and
scope of deal-protecting lock-up provisions have
5
skyrocketed.'
A.

The StrategicMerger

Corporations are increasingly using strategic mergers to gain
advantages within their industries. 6 Intense foreign competition has
focused many corporations' strategic goals on increasing efficiency and
dominating their markets. 7 While efficiency increases shareholder value
by reducing overhead, corporations appear to have concluded that a
short-term increase in shareholder value may result from boosting market

share either by eliminating competitors or acquiring an important

supplier that competitors need. 8 Typically, strategic mergers are
negotiated deals focusing on long-term growth and increasing efficiency,

11. See Richard G. Parker & David A. Balto, The Merger Wave: Trends In Merger Enforcement
and Litigation,55 Bus. Law. 351,356 (1999).
12. See Myerson & Thoyer, supranote 1, at 109-12.
13. The target is the corporation that is to be acquired in a merger or acquisition. See Black's Law
Dictionary 1468 (7th ed. 1999).
14. See Myerson & Thoyer, supranote 1, at 109-12.
15. See Norris,supranote 9, at Cl.
16. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Under the "MergerofEquals" Doctrine, Can a Target BoardAlways
Favora FriendlySuitor When a Second BidderMakes a Higher, UnsolicitedOffer?, Nat'l L.J., Mar.
30, 1998, at B5.
17. See Parker & Balto, supra note 11, at 356. For example, Unilever recently acquired Bestfoods
to become the world's second largest foodmaker. See Constance L. Hays, Unilever Deal For
Betfoods Signals More Acquisitions, N.Y. Times, June 7, 2000, at Cl. Through the acquisition,
Unilever hopes to increase efficiency and regain dominance in the food producing industry. See id.
18. See Parker & Balto, supra note 11, at 356.
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either between former competitors or between a supplier and a
producer. 9 The merging corporations are often of similar size, and
stockholders of the respective corporations own approximately an equal
amount of the post-merger corporation.20
A prospective acquirer must incur substantial costs in identifying and
consummating a strategic merger. Initially, it may be expensive for the
prospective acquirer to perform the research necessary to identify the
target as a profitable opportunity.2' Once it identifies the target, the
acquirer incurs additional costs negotiating the agreement and ensuring
that the target is truthfully representing itself.2 2 These costly and timeconsuming steps require expert analysis, due diligence reports23 by
lawyers, and fairness opinions 24 by investment bankers.2 ' All of these
costs and efforts are expended to determine the core issue in the merger:
that the price to be paid for the target is fair in the eyes of both parties. 26
Although the fair value of the target is the core issue in a merger,
considerable uncertainty surrounds the determination of that value.
Valuation begins with the determination of how much the target is worth
as it stands alone, and then focuses on how much its value will increase
when combined with the acquirer.27 To assist in the valuation, both sets
of corporate directors will retain the services of investment bankers to
determine a "fair" price for the target.2' However, valuation is a very
19. See Nathan A. Treu, Comment, Exxon Mobil, Can the Mergerof Equals Doctrine Save the
ProposedMarriageof Tivo Oil Giants?, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 989, 993 (1999).
20. See id. at 993-94.
21. See Stephen Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in Negotiated
CorporateAcquisitions, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 239, 242 (1990).
22. See id.
23. Due diligence refers to the legal audit performed on the target company. In a due diligence
investigation, lawyers investigate the books and records of the target company, check the accuracy
of factual representations, and look for potential problems. See Dale A. Oesterle, The Law of
Mergers and Acquisitions 270 (1999). The due diligence investigation precedes the signing of the
final acquisition agreement in order to give the acquirer a high level of confidence in the accuracy
and completeness of the target's representations and warranties in the acquisition agreement. See id.
24. Fairness opinions are reports by investment bankers confirming that the acquisition price is
within a range of fair prices that adequately compensates the target's shareholders. See Oesterle,
supranote 23, at 14.
25. See Mark F. Hebbeln, The Economic Case for Judicial Deference to Break-up Fee
Agreements in Bankruptcy, 13 Bankr. Dev. J. 475, 494 (1997) (describing steps necessary in
negotiating merger agreements).
26. See Oesterle, supra note 23, at 14.
27. See id.
28. See Hebbeln, supra note 25, at 494.
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inexact inquiry, and often involves a range of values rather than a
specific price.29 Although valuation studies or fairness opinions may be

important, a contested auction ° will often lead to prices that substantially
exceed any fair price determination, a price that a board of directors
cannot know without an auction.3 ' In addition, the current trend of "dealjumping" followed by hotly contested bidding wars has further widened
the disparity between a fair price determined by an investment banker

and a price
obtained through competitive bidding at an auction for a
32
company.
B.

The Threatof "Deal-Jumping"

Hostile takeovers, or "deal-jumping," by competitors represent the
most serious threat to negotiated strategic mergers.33 According to one
study, deal-jumpers or second bidders prevail in a "substantial majority"
of contests.34 In a strategic merger, the acquirer and target will negotiate

an initial offer; however, competitors within the industry may attempt to
jump the deal by making unsolicited bids for the target corporation. In
this situation, the initial prospective acquirer is at a disadvantage. Its

initial bid may provide insights into the financial viability and long-term
prospects of the target as well as a signal that existing management is
amenable to a sale. 35 This allows the deal-jumper to avoid incurring
identification and research costs.36 The deal-jumper is then able to use

29. See Oesterle, supra note 23, at 15 (noting investment bankers frequently refer to valuation as
"an art not a science").
30. See supra note 5.
31. See T. Richard Giovannelli, Note, Revisiting Revlon: The Rumors oflts Demise Have Been
Greatly Exaggerated,37 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1513, 1553 (1996); see also Gregg A. Jarrell, The
Wealth Effects ofLitigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?, 28 J.L. & Econ. 151, 174
(1985) (noting that ultimate acquisition of target typically comes at additional 17 points after
auction).
32. See infra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
33. See Lee Meyerson, Breaking Up an Existing Deal-TheArt of "Deal-Jumping",in Financial
Institutions Mergers and Acquisitions, at 647 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
639 1997).
34. Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 242 (citing Richard S.Ruback, Assessing Competition in the
Marketfor CorporateAcquisitions, 11 J.Fin. Econ. 141, 147 (1983)); see also infra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text
35. See Hebbeln, supra note 25, at 497-500.
36. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35
Stan. L. Rev. 1,2 (1982).
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the money saved on research costs in its attempt to top the initial bid.37
Absent a large lock-up, a bidding war may result where the original
acquirer must compete with other bidders for control of the target
corporation." Even if the initial bidder ultimately prevails, competition
will likely force the final price much higher than the initial bid.39 For
example, 1999 witnessed a number of high profile jumped deals:
AT&T's successful $58 billion hostile takeover of MediaOne, which had
previously agreed to a $53 billion merger with Comcast;40 Vodafone's
successful $60 billion takeover of Airtouch, topping Bell Atlantic's
original bid of $45 billion;4 and Pfizer's $90.27 billion hostile takeover
of Warner-Lambert, dwarfing the original $72 billion bid by American
Home Products.412 Given the deal-jumper's competitive advantage,
acquiring corporations use a number of lock-up devices in an attempt to
protect their negotiated deals.
C.

Lock- Up Provisions in General

The current wave of mega-mergers, coupled with the growing threat
of deal-jumping, has dramatically increased the size and scope of lock-up
provisions43 as directors attempt to protect their merger costs and
expected profits. An acquiring corporation will often demand some form
of lock-up provision,44 such as a stock option, termination fee or other
device, in the merger agreement to protect itself from deal-jumping as
well as to guarantee some benefit in the event the merger is not

37. See Hebbeln, supra note 25, at 495.
38. See Myerson & Thoyer, supra note 1, at 109-12.
39. See Bainbridge, supranote 21, at 242.
40. See Seth Schiesel & Geraldine Fabrikant, MCI Is Said to Weigh Bid for MediaOne, N.Y.
Times, May 4, 1999, at CI.
41. See Laura M. Holson, British CarrierWins Battlefor Airtouch, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1999, at
CI.
42. See Laura M. Holson, Warner-Lambert's ChiefDefends Decision to Ignore Pfizer's Bid, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 8, 1999, at C1; Melody Petersen, Pfizer Gets Its Deal to Buy Warner-Lambertfor $90.2
Billion, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2000, at C1.
43. See Norris, supranote 9, at Cl.
44. Delaware courts have tended to define the term "lock-up" expansively. See Vincent F. Garity,
Jr. & Mark A. Morton, Would the CSX/Conrail Express Have Derailed in Delaware? A
ComparativeAnalysis of Lock-Up Provisions Under Delaware and PennsylvaniaLaw, 51 U. Miami
L. Rev. 677, 678 n.4 (1997). Although the narrow interpretation of lock-ups only includes asset and
stock options, for purposes of this Comment, such measures as termination fees and no-shop
provisions are also lock-up devices. See id.
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consummated.4" The Supreme Court of Delaware, in its first evaluation
of a lock-up, recognized that lock-ups may be necessary to facilitate
mergers because they provide incentives to merging corporations to enter
and complete the transaction.46 However, lock-ups may also be
excessive, deterring other, possibly better, offers.
1.

Types ofLock-Up Provisions

Lock-ups are promises by a target's board of directors to compensate
the prospective acquirer in some fashion if the target breaches or does
not consummate the merger agreement. 7 Lock-ups are designed both to
compensate the prospective acquirer in case of a breach and to protect
the negotiated deal by imposing additional costs on other competitors
who might decide to make offers.4" The acquirer may ask the target's
board of directors to grant a number of lock-up provisions including: (1)
an irrevocable stock option, (2) an asset option, (3) a "topping" fee,4 9 (4)
an expense reimbursement provision, and (5) a termination or "break-up"
fee.50
The most common lock-up provision involves an irrevocable stock
option by which the target corporation usually grants the acquirer the
right to purchase ten to twenty percen' of the target's stock at a
favorable price.52 The right to exercise the option is usually conditioned
upon the defeat of the favored bidder's attempt to acquire the target
corporation.53 In addition, use of the stock option by the original bidder
45. See id. at 689.

46. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1986); see
also Garrity & Morton, supra note 44, at 691 (noting that Delaware courts recognize benefits of
lock-ups to shareholders).
47. See Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward UnlockingLockups, 103 Yale L. J. 1739, 1742

(1994).
48. See Garrity & Morton, supra note 44, at 689-90; see also Diane Holt Frankle, Doing Deals:
Understandingthe Nuts and Bolts of TransactionalPractice,in Counseling the Board ofDirectors
in ChoosingAlternatives,at 825 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1034, 1998).
49. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
50. See Garrity & Morton, supranote 44, at 689-90.
51. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 39 (Del.
1994); see also Dennis J. Block et al., Defensive Measures in Anticipation of and in Response to
Unsolicited Takeover Proposals, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 623, 654 (1997) (noting that target will
typically grant acquirer option to purchase from 10 to 20% of target's outstanding voting stock).
52. Typically the price of the stock option is market price before the bid. See Block et al., supra
note 51, at 654.
53. See, e.g., ParamountCommunications,637 A.2d at 39.
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may preclude an intervening third party from using "pooling of interests"
accounting,54 a significant deterrent itself.55
In an asset option or "crown jewel" defense, the target grants the
acquirer the option to purchase a particularly desirable asset of the target
at a negotiated price. 6 If the deal is not consummated, this option
compensates the prospective acquirer, because it will still acquire the
desirable asset at a price below fair market value. In addition, an asset
option may deter bidders as they may be unwilling to suffer the loss from
a sale of the asset at below fair market value." Furthermore, regardless
of the price, other bidders often lose interest once they cannot acquire the
truly vital asset of the target.58
Topping fees are a type of lock-up where the target must pay a fee to
the initial bidder if the target accepts another bidder's offer.59 The fee is
based on a percentage of the amount by which the accepted bid exceeds
the initial bid.6 For example, in In re KDI Corp. Shareholder's
Litigation,6' the parties agreed to a topping fee or "override" equal to
one-half of the difference between the stock price and any other future
offer.62

54. See Linda Vincent, Equity Valuation Implications ofPurchase Versus Pooling Accounting, J.
Fin. Statement Analysis, Summer 1997, at 5. Poolirig of interests accounting is a favorable
accounting method under which the asset and liability accounts of the bidder and target are
combined at book value as though the two firms had always been a single enterprise. See id. at 7.
This method allows corporations to record their combined assets at historical values and the
surviving entity to avoid recording goodwill. See id. Not recording goodwill results in greater annual
earnings on paper and is the preferred method of accounting for business combinations. See Phillip J.
Azzollini, Note, The Wake of Paramount v. QVC: Can a Majority ShareholderAvoid Triggering the
Auction Duty Duringa Merger and Retain a Significant Equity Interest? Suggestion: A Pooling of
Interests,63 Fordham L. Rev. 573, 596 (1994).
55. See Stephen R. Volk et al., Negotiating Business Combination Agreements-The "Seller s"
Point of View, 33 San Diego L. Rev. 1077, 1118 (1996). The body responsible for setting U.S.
accounting standards, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, has proposed to eliminate pooling
accounting by the end of 2000. See Robert Tie, The Battle Over Pooling Of Interests, 188 J.
Accountancy 14, 14-16 (1999).
56. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178-79 (Del.
1986) (noting Revlon granted asset lock-up option for key division at price below market value).
57. See Block et al., supranote 51, at 654.
58. See id.
59. See Garrity & Morton, supra note 44, at 690.
60. See id.
61. No. 10278, 1990 WL 201385 (Del. Ch. Dec. 13, 1990).
62. See id. at *3.
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A fourth type of lock-up is an expense-reimbursement provision,
which is similar to a liquidated-damages provision although not subject
to the same analysis. s3 In an expense-reimbursement provision, if the
target accepts another bid, then the target reimburses the initial
prospective acquirer for any costs incurred during the initial merger
effort.' The reimbursement covers any actual or estimated out-of-pocket
expenses such as research or legal fees incurred by the prospective
acquirer in its unsuccessful attempt to merge with the target.65 For
example, in Kahn v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.,6 Dairy Mart
agreed to reimburse the acquirer for expenses up to $2.25 million if the
merger failed for any reason other than a breach of warranty or
representation by the acquirer.67
Finally, an acquirer may negotiate for a termination or "break-up" fee.
In the event the target terminates the merger, this provision requires the
target to pay the acquirer often as much as three percent of the value of
the transaction.68 For example, in 1995 the Supreme Court of Delaware
approved a termination fee of $550 million designed to protect the $28
billion merger of Bell Atlantic and NYNEX. 69 Recently, WarnerLambert agreed to a record-breaking $1.8 billion termination fee to
American Home Products as protection for their original merger
agreement valued at $72 billion."
2.

Benefits and Drawbacks ofLock-up Provisions

Delaware courts have long recognized that lock-up provisions may
facilitate corporate mergers and acquisitions and benefit both targets and
acquirers. 7' For the target corporation, the lock-up may be necessary to
entice reluctant bidders72 "to enter a contest for control of the
63. See infra note 177.
64. See Garrity & Morton, supra note 44, at 690.
65. See id.
66. No. 12489, 1996 WL 159628 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 1996).
67. See id.at *3.
68. See, e.g., infra note 198; see also Dennis . Block & Stephen A. Raidin, Termination
ProvisionsAfter Bell Atlantic, 11 Insights, Aug. 1997, at 2, 2.
69. See Brazen v. Bell At. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 49 (Del. 1997).
70. See Petersen, supra note 42, at Cl.
71. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del.
1986); see also Garrity & Morton, supra note 44, at 690.
72. The lock-up may be necessary to entice either initial or secondary bidders.
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corporation, creating an auction for the company and maximizing
shareholder profit."73 By agreeing to the lock-up the target not only
confers a significant advantage upon the bidder but also demonstrates to
the bidder that the target's board is serious about the offer and willing to
proceed in good faith with negotiations.74 In addition, the lock-up may
serve as insurance by compensating the initial bidder for any out-of
pocket costs or lost opportunities." Furthermore, the lock-up may deter
competitors, as a deal-jumper would not only have to pay the target's
purchase price but also would bear the costs and other burdens resulting
from the lock-up provisions.76
Despite their use in facilitating mergers, lock-ups can harm the
shareholders of a target corporation. Lock-ups may be preclusive in that
other potential bidders, deterred by the size of the lock-up, might refrain
from offering higher bids for the target corporation.77 However, even
non-preclusive lock-ups reduce the value that target shareholders receive,
as some portion of the offer goes to the first bidder. In the absence of a
lock-up, the purchaser would still bid the same price and no part of the
offer would go to the initial bidder. Furthermore, target company
directors, motivated by self-interest rather than concern for shareholder
welfare, may grant preclusive lock-ups to the bidder that seems most
responsive to their concerns about job security.78 In such a case, the
directors, at the expense of the shareholder, will depress the sale price
rather than auctioning the target to the highest bidder.79 Finally,
management's enthusiasm may inadvertently lead to an excessively large
lock-up in an effort to entice a reluctant bidder to make an offer.8" An
excessively large lock-up also precludes other potential offers and
ultimately denies shareholders the opportunity to receive a higher value
for their shares.8
73. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183.
74. See Thomas A. Swett, Merger Terminations After Bell Atlantic: Applying A Liquidated
Damages Analysis to Termination Fee Provisions,70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 341,356 (1999).
75. See David A. Skeel, Jr., A Reliance Damages Approach to CorporateLockups, 90 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 564, 568 (1996).
76. See Block et al., supranote 51, at 654.
77. See Paul L. Regan, GreatExpectations? A ContractLaw Analysisfor Preclusive Corporate
Lock-Ups, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 114 (1999).
78. See Skeel, supra note 75, at 574.
79. See Fraidin & Hansen, supra note 47, at 1742-43.
80. See Skeel, supra note 75, at 576-77.
81. See id.
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II.

DELAWARE'S DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK FOR
VALUATING THE VALIDITY OF LOCK-UP PROVISIONS IN
STRATEGIC MERGERS

Depending on the form of the transaction, Delaware courts apply a
doctrinal framework that contains three different standards used to
determine the validity of a lock-up.82 The central inquiry in the doctrinal
framework is whether the lock-up is preclusive. 3 If the lock-up is not
preclusive and if the transaction does not involve a change of control, the
business judgment rule will protect the lock-up from court invalidation,
provided the decision to grant the lock-up was reached in an informed
manner.' If the transaction involves a change of corporate control, under
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc."S the validity of a
lock-up provision depends on whether it facilitates receipt by targetcompany shareholders of a maximum value for their shares.86 If the lockup was intended solely as a defensive measure against a subsequent
hostile threat and the merger involves no change of control, the lock-up's
validity, under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,87 depends on
whether the lock-up is a balanced response to the threat posed by the
future bidder.
A.

Lock-Ups Under the Business JudgmentRule

A non-preclusive lock-up in a transaction that does not involve a
change of control is protected by the business judgment rule and will not
be disturbed provided it was reached in an informed manner.8 8 Following
the business judgment rule, courts generally presume that "in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in an honest belief that the action was taken in
the best interests of the company.' 8g Any party challenging the
applicability of the presumption has the burden of establishing facts

82. See Garrity & Morton, supranote 44, at 691-94.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See Garrity & Morton, supranote 44, at 691.
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
Id. at 185.
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

88. See Garrity & Morton, supranote 44, at 691.
89. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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rebutting the presumption.9" The business judgment rule recognizes the
inability of a court to judge a board's business decisions accurately
because the decisions involve complex business factors that courts are
not equipped to evaluate.9 Therefore a court's inquiry under the business
judgment rule focuses on the process by which the board reached a
decision, not the merits of the decision itself.9 2 Accordingly, a Delaware
court will not interfere with the board's substantive decision to grant
lock-up provisions provided there is any rational business purpose and
93
the decision was reached in an informed manner.
B.

The Limited Application ofRevlon Duties to Lock-Ups in
TransactionsInvolving a Change of Control or Break-Up of the
Target

Under Revlon94 and its progeny, 95 if a transaction involves a change of
control the validity of the lock-up depends on whether it facilitates
receipt by target-company shareholders of a maximum value for their
shares.96 If it does not, then the lock-up is preclusive and should be
enjoined.97 In Revlon, the Supreme Court of Delaware found that
Revlon's directors effectively had put the company up for sale and
granted lock-ups98 that precluded further bids offering a higher value to
Revlon's shareholders. 9 According to the Revlon court, the critical
inquiry for lock-up provisions involves distinguishing "those lock-ups
which draw bidders into the battle" from those that "end an active
auction and foreclose further bidding."'0 0 Therefore, in a sale of a
90. See id.
91. See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 47, at 1752.
92. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
93. See Garrity & Morton, supra note 44, at 691.
94. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
95. See, e.g., Paramount Communications., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994);
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
96. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183.
97. See id.
98. Revlon's directors agreed to a $25 million termination fee and an asset lock-up option
allowing Forstmann Little to acquire certain key Revlon divisions at $100-$175 million below
market value. See id. at 178-79.
99. See id. at 185. According to the court, when the directors put the company up for sale, their
"role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best
price for the stockholders at a sale of the company." Id. at 182.
100. Id. at 183.
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corporation implicating Revlon duties, courts must enjoin preclusive
lock-ups that prevent the target corporation's shareholders from
obtaining the maximum value for their shares.
In two decisions subsequent to Revlon, the Supreme Court of
Delaware both clarified and limited the application of Revlon duties in
the strategic-merger context. In Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time, Inc., ° Time and Warner Brothers proposed a strategic stock-forstock merger that, in response to an unsolicited hostile bid from
Paramount, the boards recast as an outright cash and securities
acquisition of Time by Warner Brothers. 2 The court held that the
proposed merger agreement between the boards of Warner Brothers and
Time, in which Warner Brothers stockholders would own sixty-two
percent of the resulting combined entity, did not trigger Revlon duties.'0 3
Noting the absence of a controlling shareholder, the court held that there
was no change of control because control of both Time and the merged
Time-Warner would remain in 'a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated
shareholders.'"l°4
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.," 5 the
Supreme Court of Delaware further clarified the limited application of
Revlon duties in strategic mergers."0 6 Paramount and Viacom entered a
merger agreement that included a $100 million termination fee and a
lock-up stock option for 19.9% of Paramount's outstanding stock worth
approximately $1.6 billion.'0 7 Subsequently, QVC made an unsolicited
offer for Paramount, exceeding Viacom's offer." 8 This offer resulted in a
bidding war, with the Paramount board ultimately rejecting the QVC
offer."0 9 The court emphasized that the directors' duty "to seek the best
value reasonably available to the stockholders" is broader than
previously recognized and includes any transaction that involves either
(a) a change in corporate control or (b) a break-up of the corporate

101. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
102. Id.at 1148.

103. See id. at 1146.
104. Id at 1150 (quoting Chancellor's conclusion).
105. 637 A.2d 34 (Del.), aff'g 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993).
106. QVC, 637 A.2d at 46.

107. Seeid. at39.
108. See dd
109. See id. at 39-41.
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entity." ' The court determined that the Paramount-Viacom merger did
implicate Revlon duties because the controlling stockholder of Viacom
would own approximately seventy percent of the voting stock of the
combined entity after the merger."' In contrast, the court also
emphasized that Revlon duties would not have been triggered if, as in
Time, control of the post-merger entity had remained widely held by an
2
unaffiliated group of public shareholders.'
After the Supreme Court of Delaware's decisions in Time and QVC,
most strategic mergers will not trigger Revlon duties." 3 Although a
change of control always occurs if the consideration is paid in cash or
debt, most strategic mergers involve only transfers of stock as
consideration. "' In addition, directors now actively seek to structure
mergers so that the post merger entities remain widely held, so as to
avoid implicating Revlon."' As such, courts are most likely to review
lock-up provisions in the strategic merger context under the enhanced
scrutiny of Unocal or the business judgment rule." 6
C.

Unocal: EnhancedScrutinyfor Lock- Up Provisions Grantedin
Response to Hostile Threats

When the lock-up is a response to a transaction where control will not
change, the rule of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum"7 determines the
validity of the lock-up. In Unocal, the court considered an exchange
offer by Unocal for its own shares in order to defend against a hostile bid
for shares by Mesa Petroleum." 8 The court subjected the defensive
measures to enhanced scrutiny on the theory that the Unocal board of
directors might be acting primarily in self-preservation rather than in the

110. Id. at 47.
111. See Paranount Communications, 635 A.2d at 1251.
112. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 46.
113. See Treu, supranote 19, at 1013; see also, e.g., Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., No.
12883, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 275, at *33 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 1993) (noting that strategic merger did
not trigger Revlon duties).
114. See Treu, supra note 19, at 993.
115. See Treu, supra note 19, at 1013; see also, e.g., In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. Shareholders
Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995) (noting that board was firmly committed to stock-for-stock
strategic merger not implicating Revlon).
116. See Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 316-17.
117. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
118. Id. at 956-57.
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shareholders' best interests in defending against a hostile offer.1 9 The
court held that when a target board uses lock-ups in response to a hostile
threat, the board must demonstrate: (1) a reasonable belief that a threat to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed, and (2) that the lock-ups
adopted were reasonable in relation to that threat. 2 ° A reasonable, goodfaith investigation into the threat by the board of the target satisfies
Unocal's first prong. 2' Unocal's second prong focuses on the
proportionality of the response to the hostile bid. Defensive measures
that are preclusive, denying shareholders the opportunity to receive
offers at all, are disproportionate responses and should be enjoined as
violations of Unocal's second prong."
Therefore, the Delaware courts' doctrinal framework hinges on an
initial determination of whether a lock-up is preclusive. Courts evaluate
non-preclusive lock-ups under the business judgment rule. Courts subject
preclusive lock-ups to the enhanced scrutiny of Unocal or to Revlon if
there has been a change of control in the transaction. However, despite
the doctrinal framework adopted by the Delaware courts, prominent
scholars contend that alternate methods of evaluating the validity of lockups would be more effective.
III. ALTERNATE APPROACHES FOR EVALUATING THE
VALIDITY OF LOCK-UPS
Legal commentators have suggested a wide variety of alternate
approaches to the current doctrinal framework for lock-ups. Some
commentators have suggested invalidating all lock-ups on the grounds
that they all ultimately decrease shareholder wealth."z Others have
proposed blanket enforcement of lock-ups, believing that market forces
will protect shareholder value through a subsequent sale to any bidder
who values the asset more than the recipient. 24 Finally, some
119. See id. (noting "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests").
120. See id. at 958.
121. See Garrity & Morton, supra note 44, at 692 (noting that presence of majority of
disinterested, independent directors on board supports finding of reasonable, good-faith
investigation); see also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
122. See Garrity & Morton, supranote 44, at 692.
123. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole ofa Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1164 (198 1).
124. See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 47, at 1788-89.
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commentators have argued that bright-line rules setting threshold
25
requirements for invalidating lock-ups are a reasonable compromise.
A.

InvalidationofAll Lock- Ups

Two prominent law-and-economics scholars, Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel, have suggested all lock-up provisions ultimately decrease
shareholder wealth and should be enjoined.'26 They have argued that a
takeover is beneficial to all shareholders because shareholders will
receive a premium over market value for their shares.'27 Conversely, if
the target's board successfully employs defensive measures against a
tender offer, the shareholders will lose whatever premium over market
value the bidder would have offered. 28 Even if the takeover never
occurs, the threat will force managers to become more efficient, resulting
1 29
in higher prices for shareholders.
Easterbrook and Fischel have further argued that defensive measures
ultimately eliciting a higher bid are socially wasteful. Although the
target's shareholders may receive a higher price, these gains are offset by
the equal loss incurred by the bidder's shareholders. 3 ' According to
Easterbrook and Fischel, shareholders as a whole lose because resistance
to tender offers discourages prospective bidders and ultimately reduces
the threat of takeovers.' 3' This reduced threat removes the incentive for a
corporation's management to maximize efficiency and ultimately
reduces stock prices. 32
Accordingly, Easterbrook and Fischel have argued that directors
should'refrain from implementing any sort of defensive measures."'
Under this view, directors should simply carry on the company business,
although it may be appropriate for them to express their views to
shareholders.1 34 Easterbrook and Fischel would allow directors to

125. See Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 324.
126. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 123, at 1164.
127. Seeid. at 1173.
128. See id. at 1174-75.
129. See id. at 1174.
130. See id. at 1175.

131. See id. at 1176-77.
132. See id.

133. See id.
at 1194-204.
134. See id. at 1201.
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overcome the presumption that lock-ups are invalid only if the directors
substantially demonstrate they granted the lock-up for the benefit of the
corporation rather than to defeat the offer." 5
B.

Enforcement ofAll Lock- Ups

In contrast, Stephen Fraidin and Jon Hanson have suggested that
courts should enforce all lock-ups. They have argued that lock-ups are
unlikely to preclude the highest valuing bidder from acquiring the target
corporation.'36 In their view, directors of a target have every reason to
seek out the highest possible bidder; but even if they do not, directors
simply cannot prevent the highest bidder from acquiring the target.'37 A
higher-valuing bidder will either outbid the competition or, if the lock-up
is truly preclusive, will contract for resale with the winning bidder. 38
Although Fraidin and Hanson acknowledge that a resale will increase
transaction costs, they simply conclude that the costs will neither be
prohibitively high nor interfere with the subsequent sale.'39 Therefore,
Fraidin and Hanson reason that lock-ups should be enforced without
40
exception.
C.

Bainbridge'sTen-PercentRule

Finally, Stephen Bainbridge has suggested a bright-line rule that
determines the validity of a lock-up based on a specified value limit for
the lock-up provision. 14 ' According to Bainbridge, courts should
invalidate all lock-ups equal to more than ten percent of the value of the
favored bidder's proposal. 42 For purposes of the bright-line rule,
Bainbridge defines lock-ups to include: (1) all termination fees, (2) any
transaction where the target issues stock to the favored bidder, and (3)
asset options or any sale of target assets to the favored bidder. 43 When
calculating the ten-percent limit, courts should consider the combined
135. See id.
at 1171, 1203-04.
136. See Fraidin & Hanson, supranote 47, at 1785.

137. See id.at 1787.
138. See id.at 1788-89.
139. See id. at 1792-93.

140. See id.at 1784.
140. See Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 324.
142. See id
143. See id. at 324-25.
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value of all lock-up devices in a particular transaction.'" Bainbridge
concedes that in some cases his bright-line rule "will not capture bidpreclusive lock-ups and in others it will allow them;" however, he argues
that the benefits of certainty outweigh the risk of not enjoining some
preclusive lock-ups. 45 In addition, Bainbridge proposes that if a board
wishes to grant a lock-up in excess of ten percent, then it must fairly and
"voluntarily shop the company among other bidders before agreeing to
146
the lock-up."'
IV. NEITHER LEGAL STANDARDS NOR CURRENT PROPOSALS
PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE RULE FOR EVALUATING LOCKUP PROVISIONS
Both the current Delaware rules and the proposed alternatives fail to
provide an effective doctrinal framework for determining the validity
lock-up provisions. Largely because they are unable to make the
complex determinations of valuation necessary to identify preclusive
lock-ups, Delaware courts misapply the legal doctrine and consider
inappropriate factors when evaluating lock-ups. Also, the suggested
alternate approaches for evaluating lock-ups are not viable substitutes for
the current framework as they fail to retain the long-recognized benefits
of lock-up provisions.
A.

Courts Do Not Have the Valuation Skills Necessary to Identify
PreclusiveLock-Ups Consistently

Delaware courts are unable to apply the current doctrinal framework
because courts are ill-equipped to take the necessary first step and
determine if a lock-up is preclusive and should be enjoined. 147 Identifying a preclusive lock-up in the absence of a competing bidder is
extremely difficult because it requires an assessment of valuation

144. See id. at 326.
145. Id. at 324.
146. Id. at 327-28.
147. See Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 282-83 (determining whether lock-up fosters or forecloses
bidding is "costly, dangerous, but essentially meaningless, ritual"); see also Leo Herzel,
Misunderstanding Lock-ups, 14 Sec. Reg. L.J. 150, 177 (1986) ("Classifying a lock-up as a
permissible type that promotes bidding, or a harmful strain that discourages bidding, appears to be
no more than conclusory judicial labels that are affixed by hindsight.").
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procedures. 4 In order to identify a preclusive lock-up, courts must
determine if the initial bid and the added costs of the lock-up exceed the
amount any rational bidder would pay for the target.'49 Therefore, courts
must in effect determine whether the initial bid is within the top range of
values for the target corporation. 5 This requires an evaluation of
complex business factors that are "'precisely the types of issues that
[courts] are ill-equipped to explore and whose judicial exploration the
business judgment rule is designed to preclude."""' Accordingly, courts
are no better equipped to evaluate whether a lock-up was preclusive at
the time it was granted than they are to assess non-takeover-related
business decisions, which courts shield from scrutiny under the business
judgment rule.' As a result, without the presence of a second bidder
courts are unable to apply the current doctrine because they cannot
consistently determine whether a lock-up should be denied the protection
of the business judgment rule and evaluated under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum,Inc.'
B.

Delaware Courts Consistently Misapply the Doctrinefor
Determiningthe Validity ofLock-Ups and ConsiderInappropriate
Factors when EvaluatingLock- Ups

Given Delaware courts' inability to identify preclusive lock-ups, the
current framework leads courts to be inappropriately influenced by both
the manner in which the challenge to the validity is raised and the form
of the lock-up. Courts consistently fail in their initial determination of
whether a lock-up is preclusive and therefore subject to Unocal. Instead,
Delaware courts only identify and enjoin preclusive lock-ups when a
hostile, competing bidder, who would have offered a comparable or
higher bid but for the presence of the lock-up provision, challenges the

148. See Hanson Trust PLC v. MLSCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 291 (2d Cir. 1986)
(Kearse, J.,
dissenting).
149. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 282-83; Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 47, at
1750-51.
150. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 282-83; Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 47, at
1750-51.
151. Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 281-82 (quoting Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 291 (Kearse, J.,
dissenting)).
152. See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 47, at 1752.
153. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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lock-up provision. t54 In the absence of a competing bidder, courts
evaluate lock-ups under the extremely deferential business judgment rule
without first determining if the lock-up is preclusive.' 55 As a result,
Delaware courts only enjoin lock-ups challenged by a competing bidder
and uniformly uphold those granted by directors only considering a
single offer for control of the company. 56 In addition, courts sometimes
fail to recognize termination fees as lock-ups, construing them as
liquidated-damages provisions and excluding them entirely from the
established doctrinal framework.'57
1.

Delaware Courts Enjoin Only Those Lock-Ups Challenged by a
Competing Bidder

The current method for evaluating lock-ups is inadequate because
Delaware courts appear to ignore the doctrinal framework and identify
and enjoin preclusive lock-ups only when a hostile competing bidder
challenges the lock-up provision." 8 Delaware courts fail to take the
initial step of determining whether a lock-up is preclusive, and instead
identify and enjoin preclusive lock-ups only when challenged by a
competing bidder with a higher offer. For example, in Mills Acquisition
Corp. v. Macmillan, Inc.," the Supreme Court of Delaware enjoined
preclusive lock-up provisions challenged by a spumed bidder.)" The
court determined that the bidder would have offered a higher value to the
Macmillan shareholders.' 6' The court stated: "In this case, a lock-up
agreement was not necessary to draw any of the bidders into the
contest... [b]y all rational indications it was intended to have a directly
154. See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 47, at 1765-66.
155. See Giovannelli, supra note 31, at 1552 (noting that in absence of second bidder, courts defer
to decision of directors provided directors have sufficient knowledge and have conducted reasonable
investigation).
156. See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 47, at 1765-66.
157. See generallySwett, supra note 74.
158. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 36-37 (Del.
1994) (enjoining preclusive lock-up provisions that had been challenged by competing bidder with
significantly higher offer in hand); In re Holly Farms Shareholders Litig., No. 10350, 1988 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 164, at *17 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988) (enjoining lock-up provisions challenged by competing
bidder because they were intended to preclude auction); see also Fraidin & Hanson, supranote 47, at
1765-66.
159. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).
160. Id. at 1265.
161. See id. at 1274.
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opposite effect."' 2 Therefore, the court enjoined the lock-up, as it was
easily able to determine that the shareholders would have received a

higher offer if not for the lock-up provision.
2.

Delaware Courts Uphold All Lock-Ups Grantedby Directors
Consideringa Single Offer for Controlof the Corporation
Conversely, Delaware courts dismiss all shareholder challenges to

lock-up provisions granted by directors considering only one offer for
control of the company. 63 This asymmetry points to the inability of4
Delaware courts to apply the doctrinal framework. Although Revlon'1

requires courts to enjoin preclusive lock-ups, Delaware courts instead
retreat to a business-judgment-like analysis and uniformly uphold lockups granted in the absence of a competing bidder.'65 For example, in In
re KD1 Corp. Shareholder'sLitigation," the Court of Chancery rejected

a shareholder challenge to lock-ups in a single-bidder situation.67 Rather
than evaluating the effect of the lock-up, the court noted that the KDI
directors had made an informed decision based on an independent
valuation.'6 8 The court concluded that the lock-up provisions did not
violate the directors' Revlon duties.'6 9
In addition, Delaware courts are generally unwilling to apply Unocal
to lock-ups granted in a single bidder situation. 7 Courts do not
162. Id. at 1286.
163. See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 47, at 1765-66.
164. Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
165. See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287-88 (Del. 1989) (dismissing
shareholder challenge to no-shop provision because board had sufficient knowledge of relevant
markets); In re Vitalink Communications Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 12085, 1991 WL 238816, at
*11-12 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1991) (upholding lock-ups challenged by shareholders by concluding that
investment banker's advice constituted reliable information for basis of decision).
166. 1990 WL201385 (Del. Ch. Dec. 13, 1990).
167. Id. at *1.
168. Seeid. at*4.
169. See id.
170. See, e.g., State of\Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, No. 17727, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *21-22
(Del Ch. Feb. 24, 2000). However, even when evaluating lock-ups challenged by a competing
second bidder, Delaware courts do not enjoin lock-ups under Unocal as preclusive and therefore
disproportionate responses to hostile takeover threats. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1155 (Del. 1994) (finding use of lock-up agreement, no-shop clause, and
various other defensive mechanisms to be reasonable responses); Wells Fargo & Co. v. First
Interstate Bancorp, Nos. 14696 & 14623, 1996 WL 32169, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1996) (refusing
to dismiss Unocal claim relating to lock-up provisions, court indicated that break-up fees and stock
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determine whether such lock-ups are preclusive, and thus subject to the
enhanced scrutiny of Unocal, but simply evaluate these cases under the
deferential business judgment rule. Yet, because the business judgment
rule examines procedure but not substance, Delaware courts have never
identified or enjoined a preclusive lock-up under the business-judgment
rule.' 7 1 For example, in In re IXC Communications, Inc. Shareholders
Litigation, 72 IXC shareholders sued to enjoin the proposed merger
between IXC and Cincinnati Bell. 73 The merger agreement included a
$105 million termination fee and a lock-up stock option capped at $26.25
million. 74 Without considering whether the lock-ups might have
precluded other bidders, the Court of Chancery simply concluded that the
lock-ups were not implemented in response to the perceived threat of a
potential acquirer. 75 Instead of ensuring maximum shareholder return,
the court afforded these lock-ups the protection of the business judgment
rule. 176

options equaling two percent of transaction value were not coercive or preclusive and were within
range of reasonableness); In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp., No. 13587, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70 (Del. Ch.
May 31, 1995), at *33, rev'd on othergrounds, In re Santa Pac. Shareholders Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 72
(Del. 1995) (concluding that $50 million termination fee and $10 million expense reimbursement
provision were reasonable, proportionate responses); see also Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 47, at
1765-66. In fact, under Unocal Delaware courts have shown great deference to board's decisions
and have determined few defensive measures of any kind to be disproportionate responses. See
Robert M. Bass Group v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1238, 1242 (Del. Ch. 1988) (striking down
management-sponsored restructuring that was economically inferior to plaintiff's tender offer and
structured so that no shareholder vote was required); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco
Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988) (finding refusal to redeem poison-pill plan to be preclusive);
AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 114 (Del. Ch. 1986) (finding
company's self-tender offer in response to takeover attempt coercive, leaving rational shareholder
with no choice but to tender)); Gregory W. Werkheiser, Comment, Defending the Corporate
Bastion: Proportionality and the Treatment of Draconian Defenses from Unocal to Unitrin, 21 Del.
J. Corp. L. 103, 109-14 (1996) (citing Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1060
(Del. 1988) (finding draconian and preclusive board's refusal to redeem poison-pill stock rights in
face of all shares and all cash tender offers at price characterized as generous)).
171. See, e.g., Bartlett, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *21-22 (applying business judgment rule to
lock-ups granted in single bidder situation without examining whether they were preclusive and in
violation of Unocal); Repairmen's Service Corp. v. National Intergroup, Inc., No. 7811, 1985 WL
11540, at *3 (Del. Ch. March 15, 1985) (same).
172. 1999 WL 1009174 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999).
173. Id. at *1.
174. See id. at *2.
175. See id. at *10.
176. See id.
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3.

TerminationFees as LiquidatedDamages

The influence the form of a lock-up has on Delaware courts also
demonstrates the inadequacy of the doctrine for evaluating lock-ups. For
example, courts occasionally uphold termination fees using only a
liquidated-damages analysis' rather than identifying them as lock-ups
and subjecting them to rigorous scrutiny.'78 For example, in Brazen v.
Bell Atlantic Corp.,'79 the Supreme Court of Delaware upheld a
termination fee under a liquidated damages analysis rather than
evaluating it under the Unocal/Revlon framework based on "the express
intent of the parties to have it so treated."' 80 The shareholder plaintiff
argued that the termination fee was invalid because the fee was
"unconscionably" high and designed to coerce the shareholders into
voting for the proposed merger.'' Noting that the fee represented two
percent of Bell Atlantic's market capitalization,' the court upheld the
$550 million termination fee as reasonable.'83 The Delaware courts
tendency to evaluate termination fees under a liquidated-damages
analysis further demonstrates the uncertainty of what constitutes a valid
lock-up provision.
B.

SuggestedAlternativesfor Evaluatingthe Validity ofLock- Ups Are
Also Inadequate

Because suggested alternate approaches for evaluating lock-ups fail to
retain recognized benefits of lock-up provisions, they are not viable
substitutes for the current doctrine. First, enjoining all lock-ups would
eliminate any benefit the lock-up might provide in enticing reluctant
177. Liquidated damages are an amount in a contract agreed to in advance to compensate a party
for injuries suffered because of a breach of contract by the other party to the agreement. See Black's
Law Dictionary 942 (7th ed. 1999). In Delaware, liquidated damages are upheld "[w]here the
damages are uncertain and the amount agreed upon is reasonable ... ." Brazen v. Bell At. Corp.,
695 A.2d 43,48 (Del. 1997) (citing Lee Builders, Inc. v. Wells, 103 A.2d 918, 919 (Del. Ch. 1954)).
178. See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 48; Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Margaux, Inc., 674 A.2d 889, 897-98
(Del. 1996).
179. 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997).

180. Id. at48.
181. Seeid.at 46-47.
182. See id. at 49.

183. The court cited the following factors in determining the reasonableness of the amount: (a)
the lost opportunity costs, (b) the costs incurred in negotiating the merger, (c) the likelihood of a
higher bid emerging, and (d) the size of termination fees in other mergers. See id. at 48-49.
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bidders to auction. Second, enforcing all lock-ups may stifle competitive
bidding and deny shareholders the highest value for the sale of their
shares. Finally, while a bright-line rule may be the best solution,
Bainbridge's ten-percent proposal is too arbitrary.
1.

EnjoiningAll Lock-Ups Does Not Provide an Adequate Solution
Because It Eliminates Usefulness in Enticing Reluctant Bidders

Invalidating all lock-up arrangements, as Easterbrook and Fischel
advocate,'84 would fail to solve the current dilemma because it would
prevent lock-ups from being used to entice reluctant bidders into an
auction. This approach would provide certainty by eliminating the need
for any judicial evaluation. 85 In addition, it would remove barriers to
competitive bidding by eliminating preclusive lock-ups, thereby leading
to an auction in most cases and higher value bids for the target
shareholders. However, blanket invalidation would also eliminate the
usefulness of lock-ups in compensating bidders for costs and enticing
reluctant bidders to participate in auctions. 8 6 Easterbrook and Fischel's
argument that defensive measures eliciting higher bids are socially
wasteful also fails because target directors' duties run only to their own
shareholders, not to society in general.' 87
2.

Enforcing All Lock-Ups May Stifle Competitive Bidding

Blanket enforcement is also an inadequate solution because it would
fail to ensure that target shareholders receive the highest value available
to them. Similar to blanket invalidation, a full-enforcement regime would
increase certainty by eliminating the need for judicial assessment of
business issues. 188 However, enforcing preclusive lock-ups would also
stifle competitive bidding by deterring potential bidders. Therefore,
target shareholders' interests under a full-enforcement regime would be
protected only if, despite the existence of a preclusive lock-up, the higher
valuing bidder were still to attain the target through a resale by the initial

184. See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
185. See Skeel, supranote 75, at 587.
186. See id. at 587.
187. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
188. See Skeel, supra note 75, at 587.
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acquirer." 9 Although Fraidin and Hanson assert that resale costs are not
likely to be an impediment to a resale,"9 this conclusion is extremely
controversial. 9 ' Therefore, it is unlikely that a resale would effectively
protect target shareholders' interests.'92
3.

Bainbridge'sTen-PercentRule Is UnsatisfactoryBecause It Fails
to PromoteAuctions that Benefit Shareholders

Bainbridge's proposed rule, invalidating lock-ups greater than ten
percent of the favored bidder's proposal, 93 offers the best possibility for
a solution to the current dilemma, but fails to promote adequately
auctions for the benefit of the shareholders. Bainbridge's rule would
provide certainty without the corresponding drawbacks of blanket
enforcement or invalidation regimes. 94 In addition, it would prevent
disproportionate increases between the size of lock-ups and the purchase
prices of target corporations. 95 However, Bainbridge concedes his tenpercent designation is somewhat arbitrary as not all lock-ups above the
ten-percent limit are preclusive.'96 Therefore, Bainbridge's rule would
invalidate beneficial lock-ups that exceed the ten-percent limit while
allowing preclusive lock-ups that do not exceed the ten-percent limit.'9 7
Although shareholder benefit and certainty may outweigh these risks,

Bainbridge's proposal would still fail to protect shareholders from

189. See id. at 580.
190. See supranote 139 and accompanying text.
191. See Skeel, supra note 75, at 581; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028, 1037-38 (1994); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case
for FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 59 (1982);
Ronald . Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defenses, 35
Stan. L. Rev. 51, 62-63 (1982).
192. See Skeel, supranote 75, at 581.
193. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 181-89 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
196. Although the 10% limit is arbitrary, Bainbridge refers to the 10% limit as a compromise,
because courts have held that lock-ups equaling 8% of a transaction price did not impede
competitive bidding but that a lock-up totaling 17% did deter an auction. See Bainbridge, supra note
21, at 324. In addition, the 10% threshold also corresponds to the federal securities laws presumption
that a 10% shareholder is a controlling person. See id. Finally, Bainbridge believes that the 10%
trigger approximates the maximum that a bidder could reasonably expect to acquire in a stock
acquisition program before the acquirer discloses its intentions. See id.
197. See id.
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preclusive lock-ups. Instead, a new bright-line rule is needed that retains
certainty while limiting the arbitrariness of a threshold limitation.
V.

LIMITING LOCK-UPS TO THREE PERCENT OF THE
BIDDER'S OFFER WILL PROVIDE CERTAINTY AND
RETAIN THE BENEFITS OF LOCK-UPS

Courts should enforce lock-up provisions only if they do not exceed
three percent of the bidder's offer; as a matter of law, any lock-up over
the three-percent limit should be preclusive and therefore invalid. This
bright-line rule would share Bainbridge's certainty by eliminating the
need for judicial review, but would avoid his arbitrariness. By lowering
the threshold for invalidating lock-ups, the proposed rule would err
toward maximizing shareholder value by forcing auctions. Furthermore,
unlike other alternatives, the new rule would clearly define preclusive
lock-ups without sacrificing the recognized benefits of lock-up
provisions. Finally, the three-percent rule would still facilitate mergers
by promising bidders compensation for reliance costs and an additional
premium in the event the merger is terminated.
A.

The ProposedRule Is Not Arbitrary and Lock-Ups that Exceed the
Three-PercentSafe HarborShould Be Enjoined Without an
Opportunityfor JudicialReview

The proposed rule restricting the value of lock-ups to three percent of
the total value of the favored bidder's offer would limit arbitrariness by
ensuring that courts will enjoin most preclusive lock-ups. Unlike
Bainbridge's ten-percent designation, the three-percent rule is not
arbitrary because it is intentionally designed to promote auctions, thereby
maximizing shareholder value. In addition, courts have consistently held
that termination fees amounting to two to three percent of the total value
of the transaction are not preclusive of other potential offers. 98 For

198. See Myerson, supra note 33, at 671; Volk et al., supra note 55, at 1117 (noting that
termination fees of one to three percent of transaction value are likely to be deemed reasonable if
they result from arm's-length bargaining and are not supplemented by other lock-up options); see
also generally Lewis v. Leaseway Transp., No. 8720, 1990 WL 67383, (Del. Ch. May 16, 1990)
(dismissing challenge to break-up fee and related expenses of approximately three percent of
transaction value); Braunschweiger v. American Home Shield Corp., No. 10755, 1989 WL 128571
(Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1989) (finding 2.3% break-up fee was not onerous).
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example, in Kysor Industrial Corp. v. Margaux, Inc.,'" the Supreme
Court of Delaware held that a termination fee representing 2.8% of
Kysor's offer was reasonable."' Similarly, in Brazen v. Bell Atlantic
Corp.,20 ' the court upheld a termination fee equaling two percent of the
value of the transaction.0 2

When applying the new rule, courts should define lock-ups broadly
and consider the aggregate effect of all lock-ups in a merger. Like
Bainbridge's rule, lock-ups should include: (1) all termination fees paid
to the favored bidder; (2) stock options, sales, or other transactions in
which the target corporation issues target shares to the favored bidder;
and (3) asset options or a sale of target assets to the favored bidder.2 3 If
the target board grants more than one of these lock-up arrangements, the
court should aggregate the value of all the arrangements to determine
whether they exceed the three-percent limit.2
Under the proposed rule, directors would not have an opportunity to
justify an excessive lock-up. Although bright-line tests typically allow
for an opportunity to demonstrate the appropriateness of exceeding the
safe harbor," a review of excessive lock-ups would not provide a
meaningful safeguard against preclusive lock-ups. For example,
Bainbridge's bright-line rule would require directors who wish to grant a
lock-up in excess of the ten-percent limit to voluntarily shop the
company among other bidders before agreeing to the excessive lockup2 6 Other types of review shift the burden of proof to the party seeking
to enforce the presumptively invalid transaction. 7 Bainbridge's
requirement of a voluntary auction for lock-ups that exceed ten percent
199. 674 A.2d 889 (Del. 1996).
200. See id. at 897.
201. 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997).
202. See id. at 49.
203. See Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 324-26.
204. See id.
205. See, e.g., Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law, Changes in the
Model Business Corporation Act Pertaining to Appraisal Rights and to fundamental ChangesFinalAdoption,Bus. Law., Nov. 1999, at 406. The committee is proposing a bright-line safe-harbor
rule under which a corporation would be conclusively deemed to have retained a significant business
activity if the continuing business activity represents at least 25% of the total assets and 25% of
either income from continuing operations before income taxes or revenues from continuing
operations. See id. If the corporation retains less than the 25% safe harbor, then the transaction
would be put to a vote for shareholder approval. See id.
206. See supranote 146 and accompanying text.
207. See supranote 135 and accompanying text.
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would eliminate the danger of preclusive lock-ups; however, this
voluntary auction mechanism is no different than requiring a fair auction
in the first place. °8 In addition, methods of review that shift the burden
to the party seeking to enforce the excessive lock-up present the same
problem as the Revlon and Unocal standards; they require ill-equipped
courts to evaluate business factors such as valuation. 9 As courts cannot
determine the general effect of lock-ups, they will also be unable to
determine if a preclusive lock-up is in the shareholders' best interests.
Accordingly, the presumption that lock-ups in excess of the three-percent
limit are preclusive would be final, and directors would have no ability to
justify excessive lock-ups.
B.

EnforcingLock-ups Within the Three-PercentSafe Harbor Would
Retain the Recognized Benefits ofLock- Ups

The three-percent rule is a more effective method for evaluating lockups because, unlike the alternatives proposed by legal commentators, the
proposed rule would retain the benefits of lock-up provisions. The threepercent limit would enjoin most lock-ups, thereby removing barriers to
competitive bidding and ensuring that shareholders receive maximum
value for their shares at auction. In addition, the proposed rule would still
entice reluctant bidders to make offers as three percent of the bidder's
offer is sufficient to cover costs and provide an extra premium to the
initial bidder.
1.

The Three-PercentSafe HarborIs an Effective Methodfor
EvaluatingLock-Ups Because It Errs on the Side ofAuctions
Maximizing ShareholderValue

The proposed rule would benefit shareholders by erring on the side of
enjoining lock-ups, thereby forcing auctions that maximize shareholder
value. The proposed rule would strike an appropriate balance between
blanket enforcement and blanket invalidation. By lowering the threshold
limit for lock-ups the three-percent safe harbor would reduce the chance
of underinclusiveness and promote auctions for the benefit of
shareholders. Of course, it is possible that a lock-up will be preclusive
even though it does not exceed three percent; however, because the
208. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
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three-percent threshold is so low, this "preclusive" lock-up would only
preclude a minimal increase in value.
The proposed rule should also increase value for shareholders by
streamlining the auction process. Unable to rely on exorbitant lock-ups to
protect the initial bid from competition, potential acquirers would have to
rely on the size of their initial bids to deter potential competitors. This
would force bidders to offer initial bids with large premiums in an
attempt to shield the deal from competition.1 0 In cases where directors
consider only single offers, initial bids will more closely resemble prices
attained through an auction if the acquirer is concerned about potential
competitors. Likewise, in cases where multiple bidders are competing for
control, the increase in initial offers should serve to shorten the auction
process,"' reducing costs and more quickly attaining the highest price
available.
2.

The ProposedRule Would FacilitateMergers by Allowing Bidders
to Recover Costs in Addition to a Premiumfor Alerting the Market
to the Merger Opportunity

By limiting lock-ups to three percent of the bidder's offer, the
proposed rule would allow for the unsuccessful bidder to recover reliance
costs and an additional premium. Three percent of the offer will usually
exceed the reliance costs the bidder has incurred in the unsuccessful
merger effort."' Reliance costs include the expense associated with
researching and identifying the target, the expense of hiring investment
bankers and other experts, as well as the value of executive time spent on
the takeover bid.21 1 Courts have long recognized that lock-ups facilitate
mergers by assuring the bidder that its costs will be reimbursed in the

210. See Morton A. Pierce, Mergers and Acquisitions in the 80's and 90's, in Contests for
CorporateControl,972 PLI/Corp 279,289 (1997).
211. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
212. See Costs ofExxon-Mobil Deal to top $2 Billion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1999, at C1 (noting
$90 million paid to lawyers, bankers, and others who put $80 billion deal together); Jeffrey
McCracken, The DealMakers, Crain's Detroit Bus., Jan. 31, 2000, at 11 (noting that investment
bankers' fees are generally one percent of transaction value, although may be lower on deals in
excess of $500 million); Stanley Reed & Leah Nathans Spiro, For Investment Bankers, An M&A
Bonanza, Bus. Wk., Nov. 18, 1996, at 55 (noting that average fees have fallen to around one percent
of transaction value, down from two percent in 1980s).
213. See supranote 208.
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event the merger is not completed."' Therefore, the promise of reliance
costs alone may be enough to encourage reluctant bidders.1 5
In addition to reliance costs, the proposed rule would also allow the
bidder to receive a premium above costs for identifying the acquisition
opportunity. Awarding a "finder's fee" compensates the initial bidder for
putting today's merger-hungry market on notice of the opportunity.1 6
Because the initial bidder is less likely to succeed without the aid of large
lock-up provisions, some additional incentive is necessary to ensure that
corporations undertake merger research. Finally, this finder's fee would
compensate the initial bidder were some other party to usurp the
opportunity and enjoy a substantial benefit from the efforts of the initial
bidder. Therefore, bidders could still expend the effort and resources on a
merger and know that regardless of the outcome, they would still profit
from the transaction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current Delaware doctrine for evaluating the validity of lock-ups
is unworkable. Courts are ill-equipped to consider complex business
factors necessary to apply the correct legal standards for identifying
preclusive lock-ups. As a result, Delaware courts fail to ensure that
shareholders' interests are adequately protected from preclusive lock-ups
that deny them the opportunity to receive more lucrative offers in
negotiated strategic mergers. While legal commentators have proposed
other standards, these alternatives are not viable because they sacrifice
the recognized benefits of lock-ups in facilitating mergers.
Therefore, Delaware should adopt a new rule limiting the value of a
lock-up to three percent of the value of the bidder's offer. This rule
would clearly define preclusive lock-ups and would facilitate mergers by
covering costs incurred by the initial bidder and providing an additional
finder's fee for the initial bidder. This rule would ensure shareholders
receive the highest value for their shares by erring on the side of
enjoining lock-ups and forcing auctions that maximize shareholder value.
By limiting lock-up provisions to three percent of the bidder's offer, the

214. See Skeel, supranote 75, at 567.
215. See id. at 599-600 (noting that bidders are most concerned with post-merger profitability,
not likelihood that merger will fall through).
216. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
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new rule would provide certainty without sacrificing the recognized
benefits of lock-up provisions in corporate mergers and acquisitions.
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